Analyzing the role of sensors, the chapter explores how information communication technologies (ICTs) 
major elements of state power, including a nuclear weapons arsenal and a large standing army, and oil reserves that positioned it as one of the world's superpowers.
However, having a huge territory, nuclear weapons, and rich energy resources does not necessarily guarantee a high degree of statehood. On the contrary, the size of the state makes preserving the degree of statehood more challenging. In the introduction to this volume, Livingston and Walter-Drop point out that some states, "are usually not considered weak, per se, despite their inability to provide basic collective goods." due to "their ability to marshal force." The limited statehood framework allows us to conceptualize an ambivalent political situation when a state is "simultaneously too strong and too weak" (see Chapter 1, p. 8).
Russian is an example of this type of political ambivalence. Beginning in the period of the Russian empire, power holders in Moscow and St. Petersburg struggled over how to control the country. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which can be understood as the result of increasingly limited statehood in the Soviet Republics, led to a new crisis of statehood for the Russian Federation. The new Russian state had to repair immediately an uncertain command and control system, a requirement made all the more urgent given the unstable political, social, and economic circumstances. Yet, more than twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state's ability to implement political decisions and enforce them is still deficient, in particular in areas distant from Moscow, and during crises. One of the most significant-although not the only-indicators of statehood is endemic corruption; in Russia entire budgets disappear before reaching their destination.
What is more, decisions made in the center do not reach outlying districts.
In response, one of the major initiatives of Vladimir Putin's rule has been the development of "power vertical," a centralized management system that enables full control of the entire country by the person at the top of the pyramid. It includes, for example, a reform of governors' election that allowed the Kremlin to control who is going to rule Russian regions. Questions of democracy aside, many experts question the efficiency of this approach. Russian sociologist Michael Dmitriev speaks of a deep institutional crisis, one in which traditional institutions are not able to fulfill their functions (Dmitriev and Belanovsky 2012) . According to Shevtzova (2010) , the system is in fact an imitation of a system; maintaining the façade of fulfilling various governance functions has become a substitute for real action. One can argue that the imposition of vertical power eventually led to the opposite result.
While the distributed semi-autonomous system of control was neutralized, it is questionable whether the vertical system has been able to substitute for it and strengthen statehood. This paper argues that information and communication technologies (ICT) are used by the Kremlin as a part of the effort to build a "power vertical" in order to enhance its governance capacity. Yet the Russian case study also demonstrates the ambivalent nature of ICT's role for governance. ICT can just as well be used for contradictory purposes. It can serve to enhance transparency and accountability, on the one hand, or be used as a means of manipulating public opinion and to conceal the limited capacity of the state on the other hand.
The latter is not a new phenomenon. Russia has a long record in the construction of spectacles as a political strategy. Perhaps most famously, Russian Minister Grigory Potemkin is alleged to have created a series of painted façades to mimic real villages to impress Empress Catherine II during her visit to Crimea in 1787.
1 This chapter presents how ICT provides new methods for creation of virtual Potemkin villages. In this case, ICT is not used to improve the state's capacity to implement decisions and provide governance to its citizens, but rather to conceal the state's inaction in response to emerging problems.
However, monopoly of the state over construction of social reality as a substitute to governance is challenged by the same technologies that are used by the state in creating the manipulation. ICT (e.g., social media and crowdsourcing), as technologies of mass self-communication, enable emergence of a new citizens' surveillance power (Castells 2007 ). This power continuously deconstructs the "virtual Potemkin Villages." As consequence, what is appeared to be a strategy for manipulation is transform into a contest, one that demonstrates the duality of ICT and its role as a tool for empowering the state, and, at the same time, a source of countervailing power.
1 Most historians agree that the Potemkin villages are probably a myth. A century ago, Max Weber underscored the political importance of feedback and sensors. Weber emphasized the central role of information flow and feedback for the bureaucratic process and defined bureaucracy as "body of arrangements for organizing information and communication into a system for rational decision making and administration" (Bimber 2003, 95) . Livingston and Walter Drop explain: "Where information is hard to gather, manage, and distribute, one is more likely to find specialized command-and-control hierarchical institutions-bureaucracies-to manage it" (see Chapter 1, p. 10). This degree of statehood depends on the capacity to collect and process information by decision-makers. The more territory that must be monitored, the more challenging it is to collect and evaluate information about it.
Statehood and the Power of Sensors
A distributed model of monitoring evaluation suggests that the central government would transfer monitoring and evaluation responsibility to local authorities. However, that requires a certain degree of trust of the regional authorities by the central government. That is missing in Russia. As consequence, the data need to be collected directly by the center. Moreover, the regional authorities themselves are a subject for surveillance by the center.
Another system of sensors is the traditional media. However, if the government 2 Murray Edelman has noted that politics involves the specification of some social conditions as problems worthy of consideration by the polity (Edelman 1988).
controls traditional media, their capacity to provide relevant and valuable information is debatable. Censored media tend to provide skewed, unreliable, and mostly positive feedback. As consequence, a system of sensors must be created to transfer information directly to the center. It requires both an elaborate network of sensors and a significant analytical capacity to evaluate the constant information flow.
The center-oriented autocratic model of information collection is reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon, used metaphorically by Michel Foucault, in which the center surveys the entire system (Foucault [1975 (Foucault [ ] 1995 . But to what extent is the state capable of surveying the entire system from the top, especially when it is a big country with a high degree of corruption and weak institutional accountability? The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether ICT can strengthen a weak state's monitoring and enforcement capacity by compensating for deficiencies of the classical state bureaucracy, and consequently strengthen statehood.
ICT: Human and Nonhuman Sensors
Mechanism of monitoring and evaluation rely on two types of sensors: human and nonhuman. Human sensors are simply people who collect information about the surrounding environment. ICT allows for rapid and low-cost distribution of information collected by individuals to a wider audience (Castells 2007 Collection of feedback from the user-generated content platforms requires development of special media-monitoring software for data mining. In the Russian case, this software was developed by the firm Medialogy and included an iPad application that was able to compare information from social and traditional media about a particular topic and divide it into positive and negative information based on sentiment analysis (Samigullina and Badanin 2010) .
A second type of citizen sensor relies on crowdsourcing. Unlike blog monitoring, the state created a dedicated system for the purpose of collecting information from citizens about various fields of policy. An example of crowdsourcing of negative feedback is the website "Rossiya bez durakov" (Russia without fools), which was created by the Russian presidential administration (http://россиябездураков.рф/).
The website is actually a countrywide complaint book, where anyone can report problematic decisions or actions by state and regional officials.
The presidential blog and Twitter were also used as tools to collect feedback from citizens. Dmitry Medvedev has said that he reads at least fifty messages a day that have been sent to him through Facebook, Twitter, and other websites. He also said that he uses information from social media for giving direct orders: "Sometimes, when I am preparing to go to work in the morning, I go online and see something very problematic for our country. Then I print the document and write my orders 
Nonhuman Sensors: Web Cameras
One of the more common types of nonhuman sensor is a CCTV camera. A web camera is any camera connected to the Internet that sends information online.
Webcams have a number of unique features:
1. Deployment of sensors and t ransferring information is relatively inexpensive and easy.
2. Information collected by sensors can be transferred any distance in real time.
3. The information from sensors can be made available to a wide public in real time.
One of the first examples of using web cameras for participatory governance was 
Case Studies

Web Cameras and Functional Governance
In 2005 the Kremlin announced the "national projects" initiative. This initiative designated that some of the projects considered by the central government to be of special importance would get funding from Moscow and would be placed under direct control of the government and the president. This would ensure that they would be implemented and the budget would not be abused.
Two years later, in April 2007, the Russian government released a special directive entitled "A concept for creation of the state's automatic system for informational support of management of the prioritized national projects." One of its stated goals was the collection of audio and video information that would be used to confirm the realization of specific projects. It also designated a number of methods for collecting information and providing it to decision-makers. One of the tools described in the directive is the "mobile multimedia systems" that was to be installed in the office of the president and prime minister. The directive also said that some of the information could be shared with the public "on the official national projects website on the Internet in order to inform the public about how these national projects are realized" (Business Pravo 2009).
In 2007 web cameras were installed on the construction site of the Federal Center for Heart Medicine in Astrakhan. This would allow authorities in Moscow to monitor the pace of construction. Another ten web cameras were also installed in a number of construction sites in several remote regions. According to unconfirmed sources, some of the cameras were deployed without the knowledge of the local authorities.
A story shared by one of the Russian officials shows how the deployment of an
Internet-based network of sensors could empower the "power vertical" and increase the degree of statehood. On one occasion, a governor came to meet with President
Medvedev to tell him about recent developments in his region. Medvedev asked him about progress on the building of a new hospital that was being funded by federal money. The governor responded that the construction was moving forward fast and would be completed soon. Then Medvedev turned the screen of his computer towards the governor to display the web camera based live broadcast from the construction site. The site on the screen was empty. Moscow.
In addition to the devastation that was caused by the fires, the natural disaster also led to citizens' increasing distrust of the government. What is really important in the Panopticon is not the actual capacity to see everything, but the design of the system in such a way that it sends a message that everything is under control. To some extent, the Panopticon is more powerful as a symbol of surveillance than the methodology of surveillance. However, if in the classical case the Panopticon is used for suppression of individuals, in the case of limited statehood it is transformed into a strategy for deception that seeks to convince the citizens that the state is still able to govern. Deployment of sensors is a symbolic act of statehood that substitutes policy-making and decision enforcement for show. Any project for deployment of networked sensors can serve both functional and symbolic purposes, but the balance between these two can be different in various political systems.
Sensors and Legitimacy: The Case of the Russian Presidential Elections of 2012
The next big state-backed project that used web cameras was the monitoring of A few days after the parliamentary elections, Vladimir Putin (this time the Russian presidential candidate) offered to put webcams on all polling stations in Russia. He explained that the country should see what happens at every polling box, as a way to eliminate fraud as well as to minimize the capacity to argue after the elections that the voting process was unfair.
It was not the first time that web cameras were used for election monitoring. The pioneer in this regard was Azerbaijan, which introduced a webcamera real-time monitoring system in their 2008 elections. The cameras there were deployed in 10 percent of polling stations (Sjoberg 2012) . However, the scale of Russia's project was unprecedented. In less than three months, Russian authorities wanted to construct what could probably be considered the largest network of visual sensors in human history to cover the territory of the biggest country of the world.
Russia had approximately 95, 000 polling stations. The number of polling stations that were covered was 91, 000, with more than 180, 000 cameras (every station had two cameras). Of these, 80, 000 cameras broadcasted live-stream online. The rest recorded videos that were supposed to be available on request following the elections. One camera in a station was focused on the polling box, and another camera showed a general view, including the registration table. After the voting was completed, the cameras broadcasted the votes being counted. Experts and citizen activists, however, questioned this evaluation of the role of the system and argued that the cameras were not able to identify a number of potential and significant types of manipulation, that is, illegal changes in the protocols of voting or multiple voting by the same people.
In his analysis of web cameras in the Azerbaijan elections, Sjoberg (2012) argues that "authorities adjust their fraud strategies in the presence of a particular monitoring technique." He suggests that the ruling power is able to introduce compensation mechanisms that "are able to prevent vote share losses, while contributing a veneer of legitimacy by self-initiating anti-fraud measures."
The case of Russia is different from the case of Azerbaijan, first becauseaccording to Sjoberg-the major compensation mechanism was selective allocation of web cameras in "less fraudulent precincts." However, in Russia cameras covered the majority of polling stations, and therefore allocation bias was not possible.
Second, in Russia, in comparison to Azerbaijan, the degree of Internet penetration as well as Internet activism is higher.
In the Russian case, however, we can see more complicated compensation mechanisms. Even if people could see illegal activity occurring on their screen, there was little they could do about it. The system had not provided any mechanism for submission of complaints if something wrong were to occur. It also had no mechanism for recording the broadcasts. The recordings from cameras were stored in data centers and the public could submit an official request to get a limited amount of video footage. However, the process was complicated and time consuming.
Furthermore, the legal status of video recording in the courts was not defined. When an oppositional politician from Astrakhan, Oleg Shein, collected evidence of falsification from webcams in his city, the head of the central election committee responded that there were "procedural problems" and the court refused to cancel the results of voting. Ultimately, none of the 4 million hours of video footage led to a criminal conviction of election fraud or revision of election results in any of the polling stations. Deputy director of the independent monitoring organization Golos, Grigory Melkonyantz, says that in some cases judges refused to request webcam footage or accept it as legitimate evidence in fraud investigations.
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The large number of cameras that were available for surveillance via the Webvybory website made it difficult to focus on a particular place. An offline observer has usually one polling station to monitor for the entire day. But when people have access to 80, 000 stations, it is more difficult to achieve meaningful results. Information overload reduces the efficiency of surveillance. Unlike the classical Panopticon, in this Panopticon the citizens had access to the governmental network of sensors.
However, the system's architecture led to sporadic gazing instead of meaningful 7 Based on interview that was conducted by the author (September 3, 2012).
systematic observation that could lead to viable outcomes.
Online activists addressed some of these challenges. Tech-savvy Internet users developed a few methods for recording the webcasting from polling stations.
Following the elections, some groups tried to conduct analysis of data that was collected. However, doing so proved to be time consuming. Still, despite this handicap, the analysis revealed many examples of elections fraud. For example, one video captured images of the same handful of persons voting many times in Chechnya. Even members of a local elections committee could be observed doing so. 8 Despite these limitations, according to Grigory Melkonyantz, the Webvybory system engaged the public in monitoring, limited the scope of potential manipulations, and provided proof that the state was not willing to investigate strong evidence of fraud.
At the same time, the webcam-based surveillance turned out to offer major entertainment value as the biggest reality show in Russian history. The most popular polling station was a private home in Chechnya, where Internet users could follow a family, including the children, sitting around the table. Obviously no significant fraud could take place there, since this station had only a few registered voters. The
Russian blogosphere was full of comic images that were taken on webcams such as observers falling asleep, a kissing couple, and an automatic rifle left on the committee table in a polling station in the Caucasus.
In many cases the motivation for surveillance had nothing to do with politics. In the summer of 2010, at the Tver Forum, President Medvedev said that the Internet contributes to rebuilding the territorial integrity of the country and argued that e-government allows for creating an undivided space within the borders of Russia. In some ways, the Webvybory project did contribute to statehood, by allowing a symbolic self-reflexivity of the state for its citizens. Thanks to the mediation of ICT, a fragmented physical territory was transformed into a more united space.
To conclude, the case of the Webvybory project goes beyond the imitation of transparency and illusion of accountability. The architecture of the system promised that the only result of it could be increased legitimacy. A system that in theory would be able to collect feedback and translate it into decision-making instead resulted in the construction of a façade of a system able get feedback and respond to it. The webcam project was not really created by the government to get more information about the election process. Rather it was an overly large sensor system constructed in a way that feedback could not be collected nor make an impact on the electoral process, while it functions to maintain and protect the status quo.
The Webvybory project has not led to a reconsideration of the election results.
According to official results, Putin received 63.6% of votes, while some independent groups argued that the real degree of support just over 50% (Nichol 2012, 6) . 9 At the same time, it should not be a surprise that while people went out into the streets to protest the election results, the official response was that the web cameras had made the elections fair and the most transparent in the world. Eventually, the Webvybory system was used not only to legitimize the results of elections, but also to delegitimize protests against the election results.
Moscow Snowfalls 2013 and "Photoshop Governance"
Another example of video surveillance as a digital Potemkin Village is found in an initiative in Moscow. In 2011, Moscow City Government launched the crowdsourcing platform "Our city: A portal for city governance" (http://gorod.mos.ru) in order to give 9 For a statistical analysis of Russian elections results, please see Klimek, Yegorov, Hanel, and Thurner (2012) .
citizens the ability to submit complaints about problems in city, as well as to express gratitude if something good has been done. According to the rules of the website, any complaint approved by moderator has to be responded within eight days by a relevant authority. In short order, the website received dozens thousands of complaints. Many of them apparently lead to solution of a problem brought to the attention of the city government. It would seem to be a positive innovation to city
governance. Yet, some users questioned the efficiency of the website. Local media argued that the most active complainers were blocked by moderators and the website was accused of embellishing reality. Some users also argued that the platform had a suspicious number of "thank-you" messages posted to local authorities.
In winter of 2012-2013, due to the heavy snowfall, the city was almost paralyzed, and clearing the snow became major issue on the media agenda. One of the people who complained about situation through the website was a blogger and activist named Yuriy Ursu. Ursu submitted a message that said that the snow in front of his building hadn't been cleared for a long time. To prove the point he attached a photo of his snowbound building. A couple of days later day, the local authority of Orekhovo-Zuevo that was responsible for this neighborhood responded that the problem had been solved, the snow was cleared from his building, and that the local contractor responsible for the service was issued a fine. A photo with a cleaned path to the building was attached to this message.
When Ursu checked the attached photo he saw that it had been edited with In addition to human sensors, the Moscow government declared that the snow is monitored through a large network of nonhuman sensors. According to Artem
Ermolaev, the head of IT department of the city government, the authorities use 87, 000 cameras deployed all over the city and 53 human monitors to keep track of city business. The city conducts inspections that can lead to punishments where a local contractor fails to clear the snow in specific area.
Moreover, as a result of the "Photoshop scandal," the city government announced the formation of a special "feedback unit" that is to take photos of the places that were a subject to complaint. Once the problem has been remedied, a photo of the resolved issue will be posted online. According to Russian newspaper Izvestia, the officials want in this way to protect themselves from further "Photoshop scandals" (Basharova 2013).
"Clearing" the snow with Photoshop is a good example of digital Potemkin villages.
Photoshop, in this case, is another substitution for action, a mere imitation of governance that conceals the degree of limited statehood. However, no less important is the fact that this practice was exposed and transformed into a scandal that forced the government to respond.
The way the scandal emerged demonstrates the power of the crowd to expose a fraud and attract attention not only to the problem, but also to the manipulation.
The Internet user successfully employed a variety of means, including crowdsourcing platform, his personal blog, and official channels, in order to put the issue on the agenda.
While the efficiency of the Moscow government is still questionable, we can see that ICT leads to a change in the rules of the games around the accountability of authorities. Even if the technology was created to only imitate openness, transparency, and effective governance, it still eventually forced local authorities to adapt to a new information environment, one where the power of crowds wouldn't allow them to conduct simple manipulations. It also forces the officials to change the monitoring and control practices, as well as the organizational structure, in order to be able to deal with emerging surveillance power of the citizens.
At the same time, one can argue, the impact is limited since the government frames the problems in such a way, that only mid-level officials (e.g., heads of districts) and contractors held accountable, while the top leadership remains beyond the reach of accountability. From this perspective, ICT not only increases transparency and accountability but also frames accountability in a way that serves the interests of those who launched the system.
Analysis: Sensor Polarization and the Statehood Bubble
While statehood depends on the capacity of the state to collect and process information, ICT enables new strategies and methods to fulfill these tasks and, consequently, to increase the degree of statehood. It includes various technologies that allow deploying sensors or collecting information from existent human sensors, as well as applications for analyzing collected data and incorporating it into decision making. However, what the case studies above demonstrate is that the new opportunities can be used in different ways and for different purposes. ICT can provide a toolbox for the imitation of transparency and accountability. It suggests a new means for the symbolic construction of statehood.
While ICT can increase statehood, in some political environments it leads to the opposite effect. For some political leaders, the symbolic power of ICT is more tempting than its functional capacities. Manipulation with ICT substitutes for action. A symbolic construction of statehood that relies on deployment of sensors and surveillance becomes a strategy to mask the state's inability to deliver basic public goods. The Russian webcam system was not created for monitoring reality, but for constructing reality.
In case these symbolic constructions are challenged by the counter-power of the citizens' mass self-communication, state-backed ICT systems can make an effort to restore the balance of power by limiting or harnessing the power of citizens, as well as distracting them from the problems. Citizen-based systems of sensors tend to provide more negative feedback that challenges the existent status quo and requires action to address social and political problems. State-sponsored systems of sensors are constructed in a way that provides positive feedback, with some with controlled negative feedback that focuses on specific institutional segments (e.g., regional bureaucracy) without challenging the top of the ruling power vertical. Consequently, the purpose of this system is to preserve the status quo (legitimize inaction) and avoid signals that require significant action.
Both systems are interrelated. While state-sponsored systems of sensors provide positive feedback with a controlled degree of negative information, citizen-based systems of sensors continue to collect and share a constant flow of negative feedback. However, traditional institutions ignore this feedback, since it challenges their political interests.
One the one hand, in the short term the deployment of sensors focused on the construction of symbolic statehood through the imitation of control and accountability can provide relative political stability. Surveillance systems designed to preserve the political status quo can temporarily improve state legitimacy. On the other hand, the constant flow of positive feedback creates an existential threat to any system. The state and its decisions become increasingly disconnected from reality.
Polarization of the two systems of sensors can lead to a point where dissonance can undermine the state's legitimacy and foment immediate socio-political unrest.
The bubble of a symbolic statehood that relies on ICT-mediated construction can explode. It can lead not only to a wave of protests, but also the emergence of new modes of governance that provide an alternative to the inaction of the authorities.
Russian authorities have a rich and diverse e-government program. There is no doubt that development of e-government can contribute to the strengthening of statehood, as well as improve governmental services provided to citizens, increase transparency and accountability, and allow new forms of citizens' participation.
However, these opportunities also provide new tools of manipulation. The case studies presented here have demonstrated that the manipulation is likely. However, ICT as a tool for the imitation of statehood and construction of legitimacy is not sustainable. Dysfunctional bureaucratic structures cannot be compensated for by the deployment of sensors, nor can decision making be replaced by observation. Such measures can postpone the crisis, but can also make the collapse more significant and inevitable.
In the fairytale "The Emperor's New Clothes," Hans Christian Andersen tells about two weavers who leave the Emperor naked after they promise him unique suite that won't be visible for stupid and incompetent people. The officials, the public, and the king himself afraid to confess that they can't see anything until the moment a child cries out, "But he isn't wearing anything at all!" ICT can provide invisible threads that enable weaving a new attire of statehood, but this only works until the Internet crowd exposes that the state is naked.
